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Abstract: In this paper we make a new analysis of the model presented
in Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel (1984). They propose a model in discrete
time, such that at each period a new cohort ofagents enters the market
—each cohort is composed by two types of agents, high value and low
value agents— and a monopolist offering a durable good. They argue
that in this model the monopolist charge a cyclic price path as a
subgame perfect equilibrium. Instead of this, we show that either the
monopolist charge a single price forever as a subgame perfect
equilibrium or a subgame perfect equilibrium does not exist.
Keywords: Durable goods, monopolist, heterogenous agents,
subgame perfect equilibrium.
Resumen: En este trabajo hacemos un nuevo análisis del modelo
presentado en Conlisk, Gerstner y Sobel (1984).’ Ellos proponen un
modelo en tiempo discreto, tal que en cada periodo entra una nueva
generación de agentes —cada generación está compuesta de dos tipos
de consumidores, los de valoración alta y de valoración baja— y un
monopolista ofreciendo un bien durable. Ellos argumentan que el
monopolista cargará una senda de precios cíclica como un equilibrio
perfecto en subjuegos. En vez de esto, nosotros probamos que o bien el
monopolista carga un precio fijo como equilibrio perfecto en subjuegos,
o bien no existen equilibrios perfectos en subjuegos.
Palabras Clave: Bienes durables, monopolista, agentes
heterogéneos, equilibrios perfectos en subjuegos.
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1. Introduction
I
n the paper by Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel (1984) a very fice
model of a monopolist offering a durable good where there are
heterogenous agents is presented, as an example of price
discrimination. Although at first glance, indeed, the outcome should
be a cyclic path strategy from the monopolist, we show that without
further assumptions, this is not the case. Our note, therefore, opens
the issue again, leaving for future research to find conditions under
which a cyclic pricing strategy as subgame perfect equilibrium is
found.
The rest of the note is as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
In section 3 we present our theorern 1 and the proofs. Finally,
section 4 presents the conclusions.
II. The model
Time is discrete, and there is in the economy a unique durable
good. Ah agents are infinitely lived, fully rational and fully
informed. On the supply side, there is only one seller, a monopo
list, choosing price nonstochastically each period so as to maxi
mize discounted present value with a discount factor O <p < 1. It
is assumed a constant unit cost so, without loss of generality, is set
to be zero. The good cannot be rented, and the monopolist cannot
make binding commitrnents about future prices, and thus only
subgame perfect equilibrium strategies will be considered ‘equilib
rium strategies.’ On the demand side, at each period N consumers
enter the market. A fraction a of them value the product (the
instantaneous value) at b 1 rnonetary units per period, and the
remaining fraction 1— a value the product at b 2 monetary units
per period, with b 1 > b > O and O <a < 1. They value strategies as
a present value calculated as a discounted surn of all future
instantaneous values, with a common discount factor 0 </3 < 1.
Once a consumer buys the good, he leaves the market. On the
other hand, he stays in the market 2 until he buys the good. All
consumers are price-takers and huy only a unit of the good.
Finally, in case of ties between acting immediately and acting
later, an agent acts (prefers) irnmediately.
III. Theorem and proofs
First of ah, we note that if the monopolist is wilhing to charge a
cyclic path, the path is of the form:
p = (1—/3)V, +/3n1V 2 (1)
forj = 1, ..., n, for sorne n (where V = —a, with i = 1, 2), because it
exploits at the maximum possible the total consumers’ surplus.i
With this fact and notation stated, we can formalize our
Theorem 1 If /3 = p, then
a) If ab 1 > b 2 and we do not consider the no-commitment assump
tion, then there is a Nash equihibrium whose strategies are: The
monopolist charges V 1 forever, high consumers buy at the
rnoment they enter the rnarket and low consurners do not buy at
ah. This Nash equihibrium is not a subgame perfect equilibrium.
On the other hand, even if we assume the no-commitment
hypothesis, then for no n? 1, can the prices given by (1) a sub
game perfect equilibrium be.
b) Ifab 1 b, then there is a unique Nash equilihrium which is also
a subgame perfect equilibrium, whose strategies are: The
monopolist charges V 2 forever, and high and low consumers buy
at the mornent they enter the market.
Proofs
a) We denote by ir(V 1 ) the present value of the monopohist’s
stream from time 1 to infinity if V 1 is charged forever. We have
, NaV 1
—
The point then is to compare r(V 1 ) with the present value of a
cyclic path of the form (1).
In order to do this, we denote by Jr(n, 1, /3, p) the present value of
the monopolist’s total stream from time 1 to infinity if prices {p } as
given in (1) are charged forever for sorne n. We have
, 1,
, p) = {a[((i
— +1V 2 )1] +
nV 2 (1 —
1 See Conlisk et al. (1984) for a proof.
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the other hand, as time goes on the accumulation of low value
consurners will make it profitable for the monopolist to charge V 2
sooner of later. This implies that when V 2 < cxV 1 a subgame perfect
equilibriurn does not exist, if we do not consider the no-cornmitrnent
assumption.
Now, let’s assume that to charge V 1 forever is ruled out by
assumption. That is, we take into account the no-commitment
assumption.
In order to prove our statement, it suffices to note that for any
n? 1, we have i(n + 1, 1, p, p)> n(n,1, p, p), thus no n can a subgarne
perfect equilibriurn be. We can explicitly prove this using our
function f defined in (b) and noting that f’ in (4) is always negative.
It is very irnportant to notice, however, that this reasoning does
not depend on the form of the no-commitment assumption. It is the
consequence way that the monopolist and the consumers evaluate
their decisions (their pay-off functions), a process that cannot be
modified by the no-commitment assumption, without further
assumptions. That is, to obtain a subgame perfect equilibrium in
this case, we rnust modify the behavior of the consumers and the
monopolist.
This concudes the proof of (a).
b) We have to prove that, if b 2 ab 1 , then the price strategy
p = V 2 for all t ? 1 and ah consumers buying the good at the mornent
they enter the market, is the only one subgame perfect equilibrium
in this model. In particular, this implies that for no n > 1, can the
prices given by (1) a subgarne perfect equilibrium be.
Suppose then that b 2 > ab 1 and p < 1. We recali that the present
value benefits at time one if prices as in (1) for sorne n are charged
forever, are given by:
NaV 1 nNp’ r(n1,p,p)= 1 + 1 {V 2 —cxVi}.
Notice that i(1, 1, p, p)=Ç, and therefore, to charge V 2 forever
is exactly the sarne as charging prices given by (1) with n equals 1
forever. Now, we consider the function f (x) . Then,
f’(x)
= (1 )2 [1
— pX + pX],
The term
N [_((i
-)V 1 +3V 2 )pi1] + nNV 2 (1
-)pfl 1
is denoted by R(n, 1, f3, p), which is the present value of the
rnonopolist’s profit stream as calculated from the first period to the
nth period of the cycle. Therefore
7r(n,1,/3,p)1 —R(n,1,/3,p).
Rearranging,




We dernonstrate this equality in the Appendix.
Now,if ¡3=p;wehave








(n, 1, p, p)
+ nN
{V 2 -V 1 }. (3)
The expression (3) is the key elernent for the analysis of the
model.
Clearly, the monopolist would only choose cychic prices at time
one if ,r(n, 1, p, p) ji(V 1 ), that is, only if V 2 aV 1 ; therefore, if V 2 < cxV 1
he would never choose to charge prices as given in (1) at time one.
Thus, if we do not consider the no-commitment assumption, we
have that the strategy charging V 1 forever is the best strategy at
this time. Indeed, at time one the monopolist has two possibihities:
To charge V 1 forever or not; now, if he does not decide to charge V 1
forever, in principle, he would consider the benefits given by n(n, 1,
p, p) for some n (the largest of those, if it exists), due to that the
consumer’s surpius is exploited at the maximum possible (high
value consumers would never huy today at a price equal to V 1 if they
expect a sale sooner or later), but since n(n, 1, p, p) <(V 1 ), for ah n,
the best the monopolist can do is to charge at time one V 1 forever.
Therefore, to charge V 1 forever is the unique Nash equilibrium. On
(4)
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and note that f’(x) < 0, if and only if 1 + in pr < pX• Now, it is
straightforward to prove that 1 +ln pX <pr for ah x > O and 1 +ln pr = pr
if and only if x = O or p = 1.
Therefore, we have that f’(x) <O for ah x > O and hence, we have
that
for ah n? 1 and
,r(1,1,p,p)>,r(n,1 ,p,p)
ir(1,1, p, p) > ir(n, 1, p, p) (5)
ifn >1.
Take any time in the game, and the corresponding subgame.
Notice that any subgame, with the strategy charging V 2 forever, is
identical to the game at time one because there are no low con
sumers accumulated. Therefore, if we show that to charge V 2 forever
is the unique best strategy at time one, it will be the best (the only
one) at any subgame, and our claim will be proven.
Now, at time one, the monopolist can decide to charge V 1 forever
or not. If he charges V 1 forever he gets, and if he charges V for
ever he gets
I-p I-p
Therefore to charge V 2 forever dominates the other strategy. On
the other hand, if the monopolist does not decide to charge V 1 forever,
apriori, the best he can do is to charge a cychic price strategy given by
(1) with the appropriate n. Indeed, if he does not charge V 1 forever,
he would plan to make a sale sooner or later, and in this case, he
would charge a cychic strategy forever with n (because it exploits the
consumers’ surplus at the maximum possible) such that generates the
largest ,r(n,1, p, p) among ah n, that is n = 1, due to that ,rÇl,1, p, p)>
ir(n, 1, p, p) for ah n. Thus, to charge V 2 forever is the best strategy at
time one (if one would prefer a more explicit argument, it is also easy
to show, by means of a direct comparison, that to charge V 2 forever
dominates not only those strategies charging the same cyclic path
forever, but also those in which the monopolist consider to charge
different cycles one after the other).
The uniqueness of this equilibrium follows directly from the
strict inequality (5).
Now we consider the case when
V 2 -aV 1 0.
First, the fact that to charge V 2 forever is a subgame perfect
equihibrium. The proof of this is analogous to the one aboye and
hence is omitted.
Now we wihl prove that given any n > 1, then prices{p 1 (n)} 11 are
not subgame perfect equilibrium.
To this end, we wihl show that for any ke{0, 1, 2...} and any t of
the form t = kn+j withj satisfying 2 s j < n, there exists a strategy
that fromj henceforth dominates the original one.
Therefore, take one t as defined aboye, that is, t is any period
that is not a starting period of a cycle. Let’s consider the benefits
that the monopohist receives if he does not change the strategy
decided at time one from time t henceforth, that is, if he charges
p(n) at time kn +j,p+ 1 (n) at time kn +j + 1, and so on. We denote by
Jrkfl+J(n, 1, p, p) the present value of these benefits. Then




We prove this in the Appendix.
Rearranging this last equahity, we have
R(n, 1, p, p) (—1 7rk 1 i(n, 1. p. p) = p (1
— )
— aPv pj(n)p (7)
Now consider an alternative strategy as follows: To start again
from t a new period cycle{p 1 (Pt)}/ 1 for some
Then, in order to prove our affirmation, we compute the present
value of the benefits for the monopolist if from t he decides to charge
a new cycle {jQ)} for some. Denoting by7 taj its benefits, we have
aj
R(ñ,1,P)
+ (j 1)N(1 -a)V 2 p’. (8)
We demonstrate this in the Appendix.
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Recali that because 0 <p < 1. Now, observing that if we denote by {p 1 (j-1)} the
R(h,1,p,p NaV 1 prices given by (1) with j-1 as the period length, we have that
(1-pa) l-p
p 1 (ri)>p 1 (j—1)foralll=1,..,j—1, (12) for any so we take ‘i = 1 in order to obtain the best alternative at
this time. Therefore, the present value of the benefits with i = 1 is because j-1 <n. We demonstrate this in the Appendix.




IVa Zp 1 (n)p 1 ’ + (j — 1)N(1 —a)V 2 p1 2 >
Now we will show that JtaJ > lrkfl+J(n, 1, p, p) and therefore the
proofofclaim (b) will be completed. Napi(j — 1)p’’ + (j
— 1)N(1 —
We have aj > lrkfl+J(n, 1, p, p) if and only if 1=1
(1 )
— Na pj(n)p’ (9) and the right side of this last equality is exactly
NpVi + (i





Recali again that R(j — i,p,p) =NaV 1 _—
( 1 —P)
R(n,1,p,p) = NaV 1
that is, we have shown that 1—p 11 l—p
Na 3 Zpl(n)p11 + (j — 1)N(1 — a)V 2 p 2 > NaVi(’’. (13) Hence, replacing, the inequality (9) is equivalent to 1=1






1=’ Now, recalling the inequality (11), we have
and thus, equivalent to
Na pj(n)p’ + (j — 1)N(1 — a)V2p’> Na Zpi()p’’ +‘(j — 1)N(1 —a)V 2 > aVj’’. (10)
1=1 j—1
ATa Zpi(n)p 1 ’ + (j — 1)N(1 —a)V2 2 > Now, taking the left side of this inequality
1=1
NaV 1 ’
1 —p Na pi(n)p 1 ’ +p’(j — 1)N(1 —
and therefore (the last inequality is due to (13)),
we have that
i—1
Na pj(n)p 1 ’ + p3_l(j
— 1)N(1 — Nap 1 (n)p 1 ’ + (j — 1)N(1 —a)V 2 p3’>
1= (11) 1=1 i—1
________
Na Zpi()p’ +(j
— 1)N(1 — ‘—p
1=1
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which is exactly the inequality (10), and hence we have proven that clear: The best the monopolist can do at the outset is to charge y 1
forever, but the accumulation of low value agents makes it lucrative >,rkfl+J(n, 1, p, p). for hirn to drop the price sooner or later. A good model should
This concludes the proof of clairn (b). support this intuition as a subgame perfect equilibrium.
This result then, more than being paradoxical, reflects a weak
ness of the model.
IV. Conclusions
Appendix Theorern 1 is a complete characterization ofthe possible equilibrium
strategies in the model when/ = p.
Surprisingly enough, and in sharp contrast to the intuitions 1) Proof of (2):
By definition of prices in (1), we have about the set up of the model, the conclusion is that in this model,
when ¡3 p, there is no cyclic optimal pricing strategy by the
monopolist. We stress here, once again, that this result does not 7r(n, 1, ¡3, p) = {[z 1 ((1
—/3” 3 )V 1 +/-2V 2 )pJ-1] + depend on the precise way that we state the no-commitment nV 2 (1
— assumption. To modify the result, we must modify the pay-off
so functions.
At first glance, our conclusions may appear paradoxical. Apriori, 7r(fl, 1, ¡3, p) = j- {c Vip’ — >L it is strange not to obtain cyclic behavior frorn the monopolist. In
8Vp’ +nV 2 (1 a)p1} relation to this paradoxical fact we have to divide the analysis into
two principal cases: When aVi V 2 and when aV 1 > V 2 .
then First, let’s examine the case when aV 1 V 2 . Here we do not think
that the result is necessarily paradoxical. Although it depends ir(n, 1, ¡3,) {v 1 2 -i-nV 2 (1
—
pTl_
heavily on the way that the model describes the behavior of the
consumers, that is, it depends heavily on the exact forrn of the {V 1 — V 2 } zz
()J},
prices, we conjecture that if we would model the consumers’
hence behavior in another way, we would obtain the same result. This
intuition is due to the fact that it is never profitable for the ir(n, 1.3, p) — +
— — 1 —p monopolist to charge a higher price than V 2 . That is, there is no ri_f
y 1 v 1 trade off between charging higher prices than V 2 and accumulating
— L‘) J low value agents sorne periods to receive the gains of their
which is precisely the equation (2) purchases later, and to charge V 2 every period: It is always better to
charge V 2 forever. This intuition is also backed by the fact that this
equilibrium is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in this 2. Proof of (6):
model. Take any kE {0, 1, 2.. .} and any t of the form t = nk+j with j sat
isfying 2j n. Now let {pl(n)}7 1 the prices given by (1). Therefore Second, is the case when aV 1 > V 2 . In this case, the result is not
the one that people would anticipate in real life or, more precisely, 7rk+(fl, 1, p, p) = aN [pj(fl) + pji(n)p +pj2(fl)p 2 + +Vp” +
2n —y cyclic behavior should be the result of a good model. Indeed, in a (1 Q)NTll’p’ +[aN(p 1 (n)pJ’t tp 2 flJ) (1—)Tfl/ representative model, we would expect the monopolist to charge V 1 + [iN(pi(n)pi+ 1 +.. +p 2 n) + (1
—cl)nNV 2 p 2 i] at sorne times cyclically and optimally. The intuition here is quite 1=1
440
441César L. Guerrero-Luchtenberg Cyclic Pricing by a Durable Goods Monopolist: Corrigendum
for ah 1 n. Now, consider the function so
n—j] 71 1 m÷j(n,1,p,P)=aN[pj(n1)+Pj-ri(n)p+pj+ 2 (n)p 2 +.+V 2 P
(14) h(x) (1-ff 4 )V 1 +/3’’V 2
— a)NnVpJ + R(n 1, P P) for x? 0. We have
Now, observe that h’(x) = (y 2 -V 1 )J3 in /3.
aN{pJ(n)+p+ 1 (n)p+pJ÷ 2 (n)p 2 + + Vp3] +(1 —a)NV 2 p3
= Therefore, we have that h’(x) > O for ah x? O. This concludes the [ j—1
R(n,1,p,p)— z(n)P1_1] proof of (11).
1=1




— Pz(n)P1_1j + — R(n, l,p,p), pfl
Conlisk J.; Gerstner E. and Sobel J. (1984), “Cyclic Pricing by a
which is precisely the equation (5). Durable Goods Monopolist,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
vol. 99, no. 3, aug., pp. 489-505.
3. Proof of (8):
We have to prove that
— R(,1,p,ø)
aj — (Jpñ) +(
— 1)N(1
—a)V 2 p’_ 1 .
Notice that until the period j; there are j- 1 generations of low
value consumers accumulated. Now if the monopohist starts a new
cycle with period, then i-1 periods later he will earn the present
value of those j-1 generations accumulated before he started the




plus the normal present value of the new period cycle, that is
R(ñ,1 ,p.
(l.pñ)




and thus we have proven the statement.
4. Proof of (12):
By definition,
p(n) = (1 - f’)V 1 +J3 1 V 2
442 443